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The Corporate/Securities Attorney as a “Moving Target”  –  Client 
Fraud Dilemmas
Marc I. Steinberg*
This Paper analyzes the enhanced responsibilities and liability concerns that
corporate/securities attorneys have in the post-Enron era.  State ethical rules, SEC
pronouncements, and court decisions are addressed.  The ramifications of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act with respect to its impact on legal counsel also are explored.
The Paper also  provides insight focusing on the business attorney’s role as
counselor and gatekeeper when faced with the prospect of client fraud.
I. Introduction
When an attorney’s client commits fraud or other illegality, the attorney may
be held liable as a direct or indirect participant.  Such liability may be imposed under
the federal or state securities laws or common law.   Not surprisingly, private1
claimants increasingly are targeting lawyers, at times recovering enormous sums.  In2
the government enforcement context, the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) has stepped-up its enforcement efforts against attorneys, both in-house and
outside counsel.    At times, even criminal prosecution may eventuate.   The portrayal3 4
of the attorney as “gatekeeper” is now a fixture in the attorney responsibility
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landscape.5
This Article focuses on attorney conduct standards when client fraud may be
afoot.  Attorney ethical standards, the SEC’s Rule 102(e) pronouncements, and the
Commission’s Standards of Conduct as mandated by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX)
are addressed.  This Article also explores other key subjects in this context including
whether counsel has a duty to “blow the whistle,” the controversial “noisy
withdrawal” issue, predecessor-successor counsel communications, and responding
to auditor requests concerning client contingent liabilities.
II. Ethical Rules
Under applicable ethical rules, a lawyer retained by a corporation (or other
business organization) represents such entity acting through the entity’s authorized
constituents (e.g., its board of directors or senior management).   If counsel for a6
business enterprise knows  that an officer, employee or other individual affiliated7
with that enterprise is engaged in a violation of law that reasonably might be
attributed to the enterprise and that is likely to cause substantial injury to the
organization, then counsel shall proceed as is reasonably necessary in the
organization’s best interest.  In fulfilling this directive, counsel “shall refer the matter
to higher authority in the organization, including, if warranted by the circumstances,
to the highest authority that can act on behalf of the organization as determined by
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applicable law [e.g., the corporation’s board of directors].”   After the attorney’s8
referral to the board of directors or comparable authority, if the wrongdoers persist
in the illegality that is reasonably certain to cause substantial injury to the enterprise,
then counsel should resign from the representation.  Moreover, under the vast9
majority but not all state ethical rules,  counsel may reveal information outside the10
organization to the extent that such information is necessary to prevent or mitigate the
client’s fraud or crime.   11
Two other ethical rules merit identification in this setting.  One is that counsel
shall not knowingly assist a client in conduct that is fraudulent or criminal.   The12
second, which may arise in the legal opinion or drafting context,  provides that an13
attorney may not knowingly “make a false statement of material fact or law to a third
person or fail to disclose a material fact when disclosure is necessary to avoid
assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by a client, unless disclosure is prohibited by
Rule 1.6.”   A number of states base a violation of this ethical mandate on an14
attorney’s negligence.15
III. Duty to “Blow the Whistle”
The following discussion focuses on an attorney’s duty under the federal
securities laws to disclose her client’s misstatements to third parties.  Generally, to
establish Securities Exchange Act Section 10(b)  (or other federal securities law)16
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liability on the basis of counsel’s silence, a duty to disclose must be established.17
Several courts have concluded that the federal securities laws are not the source of
such a duty.   Further, absent a fiduciary duty between plaintiff and defendant, there18
is generally no liability for failing to blow the whistle at common law.   Rather, as19
a general principle, the secondary actor’s duty to disclose may arise where a fiduciary
or other confidential relationship is found to exist.20
Based on counsel’s silence, the duty to disclose or “blow the whistle” on one’s
client thus is unlikely to give rise to securities law liability.   As held by the U.S.21
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, lawyers have no independent duty to “blow
the whistle.”   Elaborating, the court pronounced:22
The extent  to which lawyers . . . should reveal their client’s 
wrongdoing – and to whom they should reveal – is a question of great moment.
. . .   We express no opinion on whether the [law firms] did what they should,
whether there was malpractice under state law, or whether the rules of ethics
(or other fiduciary doctrines) ought to require lawyers . . . to blow the whistle
in equivalent circumstances.  We are satisfied, however that an award of
damages under the securities laws is not the way to blaze the trail toward
improved ethical standards in the legal profession.  Liability depends on an
existing duty to disclose.  The securities law therefore must lag behind changes
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in ethical and fiduciary standards.  The plaintiffs have not pointed to any rule
imposing on either [law firm] a duty to blow the whistle.”23




SEC actions against attorneys are most often, though not always,  products of25
SEC administrative,  injunctive  or disciplinary proceedings.   In these actions, the26 27 28
Commission has commented on the role that attorneys play in the disclosure process
and, at times, has ordered the restructuring of internal procedures of law firms.   29
For example, in In re Fields,  the Commission asserted that securities lawyers30
occupy a strategic position in the investment process and that the SEC, with its
limited resources, “is peculiarly dependent on the probity and diligence of the
professionals who practice before it.”   31
With respect to the lack of adequate internal procedures within law firms, the
Commission has ordered that these procedures be revised where appropriate.  In this
context, the SEC has posited that “[a] law firm has a duty to make sure that disclosure
documents filed with the Commission include all material facts about a client of
which it has knowledge as a result of its legal representation of that client.”32
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B. SEC Rule 102(e)
The SEC over the past three decades has brought several disciplinary
proceedings under Rule 2(e) (now Rule 102(e)) against lawyers and accountants.33
Rule 102(e) generally provides that the SEC may temporarily suspend or permanently
bar any person from practice before it upon finding such person (1) to lack the
requisite qualifications to represent others, (2) to lack character or integrity or to have
engaged in improper or unethical professional conduct, or (3) to have willfully
violated or aided and abetted a violation of any provision of the federal securities
laws or any rule or regulation thereunder.   This rule has been codified in part34
pursuant to enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) as an amendment
to the Securities Exchange Act.35
The SEC’s invocation of Rule 102(e) has been extensively criticized.   The36
Commission has responded that the rule, rather than being an enforcement
mechanism, is necessary to preserve the integrity of its own processes.   Prior to the37
enactment of SOX in 2002 (which codified in part Rule 2(e) (or Rule 102(e)),  the38
courts, with certain exceptions,  agreed with the SEC.   The most significant39 40
decision upholding the Commission’s authority under Rule 2(e) is Touche Ross &
Co., v. SEC.   Although that case specifically concerned the discipline of41
accountants, the language employed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
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Circuit applies as well to the SEC’s disciplinary authority over attorneys.  The court
reasoned:
The role of the accounting and legal professions in implementing the
objectives of the disclosure policy has increased in importance as the number
and complexity of securities transactions has increased.  By the very nature of
its operations, the Commission, with its small staff and limited resources,
cannot possibility examine, with the degree of close scrutiny required for full
disclosure, each of the many financial statements which are filed.  Recognizing
this, the Commission necessarily must rely heavily on both the accounting and
legal professions to perform their tasks diligently and responsibly.  Breaches
of professional responsibility jeopardize the achievement of the objectives of
the securities laws and can inflict great damage on public investors.  As our
Court [has] observed . . ., “In our complex society the accountants’ certificates
or the lawyer’s opinion can be instruments for inflicting pecuniary loss more
potent than a chisel or a crowbar.”42
Thus, the Second Circuit concluded:
To summarize: we reject appellant’s assertion that the Commission acted
without authority in promulgating Rule 2(e).  Although there is no express
statutory provision authorizing the Commission to discipline professionals
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appearing before it,  Rule 2(e), promulgated pursuant to its statutory
rulemaking authority, represents an attempt by the Commission to protect the
integrity of its own processes.  It provides the Commission with the means to
ensure that those professionals, on whom the Commission relies heavily in the
performance of its statutory duties, perform their tasks diligently and with a
reasonable degree of competence.  As such the Rule is “reasonably related” to
the purposes of the securities laws.  Moreover, we hold that the Rule does not
violate, nor is it inconsistent with, any other provision of the securities laws.
We therefore sustain the validity of the Rule as a necessary element adjunct to
the Commission’s power to protect the integrity of its administrative
procedures and the public in general.43
An important issue that the Second Circuit in Touche Ross raised but left
unresolved is whether the Commission has the authority to discipline an entire firm
for the misconduct of certain of its members.   In a significant Rule 2(e) proceeding44
against a law firm, the SEC pointed out that the case involved the firm’s failure to
maintain adequate internal control mechanisms which would have “assured that the
knowledge of the members of the firm was communicated to the persons responsible
for preparing disclosure documents so that adequate disclosure of material
information – which was within the firm’s knowledge – was made.”   Moreover, the45
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Commission found it appropriate to state that the proceeding was “not [one] where
a law firm is being held accountable for knowledge or conduct of a few of its
members.”   46
Perhaps the most significant administrative disciplinary proceeding brought
against attorneys pursuant to Rule 2(e) is that of In the Matter of Carter and
Johnson.   There, the Commission’s Office of General Counsel had argued that47
where a lawyer’s advice has been repeatedly rejected by management and where
management persists in exposing the corporation to substantial risk of legal liability,
the lawyer may have an obligation to go up the hierarchal structure within the
corporation to the board of directors in order to prevent what the lawyer believes to
be present or future violations of the law.  The General Counsel argued that this duty
to go to the board may be necessary in order to fulfill the lawyer’s obligation
adequately to advise the corporate client.   48
In 1982, the Williams Commission handed down its opinion in the Carter-
Johnson case.   It reversed the decision of the administrative law judge, who had49
found that Carter and Johnson, lawyers who were experienced in corporate and
securities matters, had violated the federal securities laws and had engaged in
improper professional conduct.50
The Commission dismissed the proceeding against the two lawyers.  While
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asserting once again its jurisdiction to conduct these kinds of proceedings,  it found51
that the lawyers were neither direct violators nor aiders and abettors of their client’s
violations.   Moreover, the Commission found that the attorneys had not violated52
standards of professional responsibility because it could not conclude that the
attorneys’ conduct transgressed standards that were generally accepted at the time.53
The Commission did, however, discuss the general standards of professional conduct
that should guide lawyers in the future, stating:
[A] lawyer must, in order to discharge his professional responsibilities, make
all efforts within reason to persuade his client to avoid or terminate proposed
illegal action.  Such efforts could include, where appropriate, notification to
the board of directors of a corporate client.54
The Commission emphasized that the articulation of principles of professional
conduct to the special role of the securities lawyer giving disclosure advice to a
corporate client was not a simple task.  It pointed out that the lawyer is only an
adviser and the final judgment and, indeed, responsibility as to what course of
conduct is to be taken must lie with the client.  The Commission acknowledged that
disclosure issues often present difficult choices between multiple shades of gray and
that the fact the corporate client is pressing its lawyer hard for the minimum
disclosure required by law is, by itself, not an appropriate basis for finding that a
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lawyer must resign or take some extraordinary action.  The opinion emphasized that
the SEC would not seek to hold lawyers responsible for the good faith exercise of
professional judgment even if, in view of hindsight, the advice turned out to be
wrong.  The Commission was concerned that stiffer requirements might drive a
wedge between reporting companies and their outside lawyers and that, under certain
circumstances, management would soon realize there was nothing to be gained from
consulting such lawyers.   The SEC stated:55
The Commission is of the view that the lawyer engages in “unethical or
improper professional conduct” under the following circumstances: When a
lawyer with significant responsibilities in the effectuation of a company’s
compliance with the disclosure requirements of the federal securities laws
becomes aware that his client is engaged in a substantial and continuing failure
to satisfy those disclosure requirements, his continued participation violates
professional standards unless he takes prompt steps [“that leads to the
conclusion that the lawyer is engaged in efforts to correct the underlying
problem, rather than having capitulated to the desires of a strong-willed, but
misguided client”] to end the client’s non-compliance.
Initially, counseling accurate disclosure is sufficient, even if [the
attorney’s] advice is not accepted.  But there comes a point at which a
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reasonable lawyer must conclude that his advice is not being followed, or even
sought in good faith, and that his client is involved in the continuing course of
violating the securities laws.  At this critical juncture, the lawyer must take
further, more affirmative steps in order to avoid the inference that he has been
co-opted, willingly or unwillingly, into the scheme of nondisclosure.
So long as a lawyer is acting in good faith in exerting reasonable efforts
to prevent violations of the law by his client, his professional obligations have
been met.56
C. SEC Standards of Professional Conduct
Among the many significant provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Congress
mandated that the SEC promulgate a rule focusing on attorney “up the ladder”
reporting with respect to a corporate client when faced with a material violation of
fiduciary duty, securities law, or similar violation by a subject corporation or
constituent (such as a director, officer or employee).  Under Section 307 of SOX,
Congress directed the SEC to adopt a rule:
(1) requiring [a subject] attorney to report evidence of a material violation of
securities law or breach of fiduciary duty or similar violation by the company
or any agent thereof, to the chief legal counsel or the chief executive officer of
the company (or the equivalent thereof); and (2) if the counsel or officer does
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not appropriately respond to the evidence (adopting, as necessary, appropriate
remedial measures or sanctions with respect to the violation), requiring [such]
attorney to report the evidence to the audit committee of the board of directors
of the issuer or to another committee of the board of directors comprised solely
of directors not employed directly or indirectly by the issuer, or to the board of
directors.57
Section 307 and a large part of the SEC’s response resemble existing ethical
standards as set forth by the American Bar Association, the American Law Institute,
and the states.   Responding to Congress’ directive, the SEC adopted standards58
implementing “up the ladder” reporting  and recognized the legitimacy of a Qualified59
Legal Compliance Committee (QLCC) to serve as an alternative.   60
In its promulgation of its Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, the
applicable rules 
• require an attorney to report evidence of a material violation, determined
according to an objective standard, “up-the-ladder” within the issuer to
the chief legal counsel or the chief executive officer of the company or
the equivalent;
• require an attorney, if the chief legal counsel or the chief executive
officer of the company does not respond appropriately to the evidence,
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to report the evidence to the audit committee, another committee of
independent directors, or the full board of directors;
• clarify that the rules cover attorneys providing legal services to an issuer
who have an attorney-client relationship with the issuer, and who have
notice that documents they are preparing or assisting in preparing will
be filed with or submitted to the Commission;
• provide that foreign attorneys who are not admitted in the United States,
and who do not advise clients regarding U.S. law, would not be covered
by the rule, while foreign attorneys who provide legal advice regarding
U.S. law would be covered to the extent they are appearing and
practicing before the Commission, unless they provide such advice in
consultation with U.S. counsel;
• allow an issuer to establish a “qualified legal compliance committee”
(QLCC) as an alternative procedure for reporting evidence of a material
violation.  Such QLCC would consist of at least one member of the
issuer’s audit committee, or an equivalent committee of independent
directors, and two or more independent board members, and would have
the responsibility, among other things, to recommend that an issuer
implement an appropriate response to evidence of a material violation.
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One way in which an attorney could satisfy the rule’s reporting
obligation is by reporting evidence of a material violation to a QLCC;
• allow an attorney, without the consent of an issuer client, to reveal
confidential information related to his or her representation to the extent
the attorney reasonably believes necessary (1) to prevent the issuer from
committing a material violation likely to cause substantial financial
injury to the financial interests or property of the issuer or investors; (2)
to prevent the issuer from committing an illegal act; or (3) to rectify the
consequences of a material violation or illegal act in which the
attorney’s services have been used;
• state that the rules govern in the event the rules conflict with state law,
but will not preempt the ability of a state to impose more rigorous
obligations on attorneys that are not inconsistent with the rules; and 
• affirmatively state that the rules do not create a private cause of action
and that authority to enforce compliance with the rules is vested
exclusively with the Commission.”61
The Commission has taken the position that its Standards of Conduct preempt
any conflicting provision of state law, including state ethical standards, that do not
meet its minimum requirements.   Not surprisingly, states (such as California), that62
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do not permit attorney disclosure of client confidences to prevent financial harm,63
disagree with the SEC’s position.64
V. Noisy Withdrawal
In adopting its Standards of Conduct, the Commission declined to adopt the
attorney “noisy withdrawal” provisions as proposed by the SEC in an earlier release.65
Under this proposal, if the corporate client refused to take appropriate corrective
action after counsel dutifully went “up the ladder,” counsel was obligated to make a
“noisy withdrawal,” notifying the SEC that such counsel disaffirmed documents that
she had prepared during the course of the representation.   At that time, the66
Commission said that it was still considering adoption of the noisy withdrawal
provision along with certain alternatives.   One of these alternatives would require67
the affected company (rather than counsel) to notify the Commission of the attorney’s
withdrawal from representation on the basis that such counsel did not receive a
suitable response to a report concerning a material violation.   In view of the time68
period that has elapsed since these rule proposals, it appears unlikely that the SEC
(absent further impetus) will adopt a noisy withdrawal rule.
The making of a noisy withdrawal, of course, sounds a siren that fraud or other
grievous misconduct likely is afoot.  Corporate fiduciaries and the securities bar (as
well as groups such as the American Bar Association) reacted to the SEC’s proposal
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with alarm, asserting that such a noisy withdrawal mandate would drive a wedge
between attorneys and corporate insiders.   Afraid that counsel would “blow the69
whistle” (albeit by action rather than words), constituents of the business enterprise
would be reluctant to seek legal advice on troubling subjects.   Thus, the proposed70
provision, according to opponents, would be quite detrimental.   Proponents favoring71
a noisy withdrawal provision, on the other hand, assert that counsel must have this
leverage in order to better ensure that corrective action is taken, thereby protecting
the corporate client, its shareholders, and creditors.  Hence, faced with the reality that
counsel must make a noisy withdrawal if appropriate steps are not undertaken,
corporate insiders will be “persuaded” to act in compliance with the law.72
Regardless of the SEC’s inaction, the noisy withdrawal dilemma continues to
impact the corporate/securities practitioner.  Depending on the circumstances, an
attorney who discovers that a disclosure document that she drafted is materially false
and is being relied upon by investors to their financial detriment may not simply
withdraw from the representation.  That alone may not be sufficient.  In such
situations, counsel may have to disaffirm her work product, hence making a noisy
withdrawal, in order to effectuate the withdrawal.  As stated in an ABA Formal
Opinion, “where the client  avowedly intends to continue to use the lawyer’s work
product, this amounts to a de facto continuation of representation even if the lawyer
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has ceased to perform any additional work.”   Hence, “[t]he representation is not73
completed, any more than the fraud itself is completed.”   Comments to the ABA74
Model Rules of Professional Conduct provide further support for this position.   75
Accordingly, counsel who withdraws from representing a client committing
fraud or other illegal conduct often would be prudent to do more than “quietly”
resign.  In such circumstances, it may be appropriate for the attorney to inform the
SEC, the applicable state regulator, and/or investors of counsel’s withdrawal based
on “professional reasons.” No client confidence or secret must be revealed.  The fact
of this communication alone should serve as a “red flag” to government authorities
and reasonable investors that illegal or unethical conduct may be present.  As
importantly, the threat by the attorney to the client that counsel will make this
communication if the client fails to take corrective action acts as a powerful measure
to induce client compliance.  This leverage may well be necessary to avert fraud or
illegality, investor financial loss, and the imposition of liability.
Critics of this recommendation perceptively assert that the issues involved in
disclosure determinations, such as materiality,  often are problematic.  Rather than76
a clear duty to disclose, variations in the “gray” zone often arise.  Without the benefit
of hindsight, an attorney’s good faith interpretation may prove erroneous.  Indeed,
public knowledge of an attorney’s noisy withdrawal may cause the market price of
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the subject company’s stock to plummet.  If counsel is mistaken as to the commission
of a material violation (when no such violation exists), claims for attorney
malpractice, among others, may ensue.  Hence, in practical effect, in order to comply
with the applicable ethical norms and act in the corporate client’s best interests,
counsel must be certain that fraud or other major impropriety is afoot before making
a noisy withdrawal.  Unfortunately, as critics observe, certainty does not frequently
prevail in the “real world.”77
The solution to this dilemma is rather straightforward.  In situations where an
attorney counsels that the corporate client must undertake certain corrective action
and that advice is resisted by the independent directors of the board of directors,
counsel should insist that the client procure an independent “second opinion” from
an unaffiliated lawyer (or law firm).   Although such a second opinion may be costly,78
may bruise counsel’s ego, and may pose a threat that the second opining law firm will
“steal” the client, this solution has been recognized for decades and is now firmly
entrenched in ethical norms.   Indeed, the SEC Standards of Conduct adopted allow79
for the procurement of a second opinion to constitute an “appropriate response” under
specified circumstances.     The employment of attorney second opinions thus is a80
sound practice to help persuade corporate insiders that appropriate corrective action
is required and serves as a meaningful protective mechanism to minimize attorney
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liability.  Hence, use of the “second opinion” in this context normally will enhance
the accuracy of the legal advice rendered, thereby serving the best interests of both
client and counsel.81
VI. Responding to Auditor Requests
A customary practice of auditors is to transmit audit inquiry letters to client
corporations, which thereupon forward such requests to their counsel for assessment
and response.  Such a letter normally asks counsel to provide the auditor with certain
information regarding the client’s affairs.  The information provided is employed by
the auditor in opining on the corporation’s annual financial reports.   Among other82
items, the audit inquiry letter will seek information relating to contingent liabilities.83
Such “loss contingency” requests may cause tension.  On the one hand, there
is counsel’s desire to preserve the client’s confidences and secrets, as well as the
client’s desire to avoid disclosure of unfavorable information.  For example,
disclosure of a contingent unasserted liability may amount to advertising a client’s
possibly illegal conduct - a particularly undesirable event for the corporation where
potential plaintiffs are ignorant of the possible claim.   In addition, disclosure of a84
client’s confidences incurs risk of waiving both the attorney-client and work product
privileges.   On the other hand, the auditor has a legitimate need to obtain adequate85
information in order to fulfill its duties consistent with the policy supporting public
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confidence in published financial statements.   86
Competing against these considerations is the ever-present threat that an
attorney’s failure to disclose material facts may subject the attorney and client to
liability exposure under the securities laws.   In addition to potential liability for87
violation of the federal securities acts’ antifraud provisions, SEC Rule 13b2-2(b), as
amended by the SEC pursuant to the directive set forth in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,88
may raise liability concerns for counsel who allegedly “provide[s] an auditor with an
inaccurate or misleading legal analysis.”89
In an effort to resolve these competing interests, the Financial Accounting
Standards Board promulgated its Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No.
5 (“SFAS 5") and the ABA adopted its Statement of Policy Regarding Lawyers’
Responses To Auditors’ Requests for Information.   Pursuant to the truce arrived at90
through these pronouncements, the following practice has been implemented with
respect to “loss contingencies”:
When properly requested by the client, it is appropriate for the lawyer to
furnish to the auditor information concerning the following matters if the
lawyer has been engaged by the client to represent or advise the client
professionally with respect thereto and he has devoted substantive attention to
them in the form of legal representation or consultation:
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(a) overly threatened or pending litigation, whether or not specified by
the client;
(b) a contractually assumed obligation which the client has specifically
identified and upon which the client has specifically requested, in the inquiry
letter or a supplement thereto, [for] comment to the auditor;
(c) an unasserted possible claim or assessment which the client has
specifically identified and upon which the client has specifically requested, in
the inquiry letter or a supplement thereto, [for] comment to the auditor.91
According to the ABA Policy Statement, counsel normally should not express
judgment as to the outcome of claims delineated unless it appears to counsel that an
unfavorable outcome is either “probable” or “remote.”   With respect to unasserted92
possible claims or assessments, where a potential claimant has not manifested an
awareness of the potential claim, disclosure is required only if the client concludes
that “(i) it is probable that a claim will be asserted, (ii) there is a reasonable
possibility, if the claim is in fact asserted, that the outcome will be unfavorable, and
(iii) the liability resulting from such unfavorable outcome would be material to [the
company’s] financial condition.”   Hence, by leaving the decision to reveal93
contingent liability for unasserted claims to the client, nondisclosure may well be the
likely consequence.94
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In the wake of Sarbanes-Oxley, attorneys today face heightened tensions in
responding to auditor requests for information.  In addition to the long-standing
issues addressed above, attorneys must deal with the recent SEC rulemaking
concerning improper influence on auditors.   With the SEC’s focus on attorneys as95
gatekeepers, as evidenced by the initiation of dozens of proceedings against legal
counsel,  enhanced pressure has been placed upon lawyers in the audit response96
process.97
VII. Predecessor-Successor Counsel Communications
A significant issue is the extent to which counsel who resigns from a
representation due to client fraud can inform prospective successor counsel of the
facts and circumstances surrounding the resignation.  In In re OPM Leasing Services.,
Inc.,  predecessor counsel maintained a closed-mouth posture, evidently in order to98
preserve the former client’s confidences and secrets.   Such an approach,99
unfortunately, enables the client to perpetuate its fraudulent conduct, utilizing
unwitting successor counsel as a resource to effectuate its objectives.
The justification for predecessor counsel’s silence in this situation is
unpersuasive.  Former counsel should not stand idly by acquiescing in the former
client’s retention of successor counsel, thereby resulting in further injury to innocent
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victims.  In such situations, predecessor counsel should send “red flags” to the
inquiring attorney.   For example, predecessor counsel may state: “I’m unable by the100
ethical rules to explain why I resigned unless the former client gives me permission
to tell you.”  If the prospective client refuses to give such permission, this should
signal to the inquiring attorney that the contemplated engagement should be
declined.   In any event, counsel may be prudent to draft a memorandum to the file101
documenting the contents of the inquiry.102
VIII. Reality Check – The Role of Circumstantial Evidence
A lawyer involved in counseling a client involved in fraud or other illegal
conduct is, of course, in a difficult position.  Counseling appropriate corrective action
is essential.  If the client declines to adhere to the lawyer’s advice, withdrawal from
the representation becomes a necessity.   Nevertheless, if the attorney’s work103
product is being used by the client to perpetuate an ongoing fraud, withdrawal alone
under certain circumstances may not be sufficient.  This is so even if the attorney was
unaware of the fraud when rendering advice to the client.   104
In assessing the practical realities, the role of circumstantial evidence in often
key.   Frequently, to avoid liability the attorney must be viewed as credible by the105
fact-finder.  Plaintiffs will allege that, due to the fraud or other misconduct that was
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perpetrated, the attorney “must” have known of the pertinent circumstances during
the time of the engagement.  In certain situations, other alleged violators will claim
that they relied upon the attorney for legal advice and that the attorney was informed
of all the material facts.  The generous legal fees that lawyers receive may provide the
plaintiffs with ammunition for asserting a motive underlying the alleged misconduct.
When counsel has an equity stake in the client, this arrangement will be prominently
displayed before the jury.    Not surprisingly, if the question of the lawyer’s106
knowledge of the alleged misconduct is one for the jury, the subject attorney should
have great concern.
IX. Conclusion
This Article has addressed a myriad of issues when a corporate/securities
attorney’s client contemplates or engages in fraudulent conduct.  Recent history
evidences that counsel has been reluctant to inform the client’s independent directors
when confronted with senior management transgressions.  This disinclination has
proven disastrous for the corporate client, its shareholders, employees, and other
affected constituencies.  Such failure also has saddled subject counsel with enormous
monetary liability.  A lesson to be learned by counsel from the recent corporate
debacles is that use of the “second opinion” mechanism should be resorted to with
greater frequency and that the affected client’s independent directors, including the
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members of the audit committee, should be better informed of irregularities.  If these
practices are implemented, instances where counsel must resign or feel obliged to
make a “noisy withdrawal” should be rare.
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2.  See, e.g., Denney v. Jenkens & Gilchrist, 2005 WL 388562 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)
(settlement between law firm and former clients approved for over $81 million);
“KPMG, Sidley reach $225/M Tax Settlement,” Nat. L.J., Oct. 3, 2005, at p.3;
“Arizona Law Firm Pays $21 Million, Denies Role in Baptist Foundation
Collapse,” 34 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 602 (2002); Craig and Scannel, “Judges
Fraud Ruling Puts Heat on Morgan Stanley, Law Firm,” Wall St. J., March 24,
2005, at p. A1; Davis, “On the Hot Seat,” Wall St. J., July 18, 2003, at p. C1;
Jones, “Kirkland & Ellis Gets a Black Eye For Now,” Nat. L.J., April 4, 2005, at
p.6; Pollock, “Lawyers for Enron Faulted Its Deals, Didn’t Force Issue,” Wall St.
J., May 22, 2002, at p. A1; Schwartz, “Law Firms Hit With More Lawsuits,” Nat.
Press, Book Fulfillment, 105 Madison Avenue, New York, New York 10016, or on
the Web at www.lawcatalog.com.
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L.J., May 16, 2005, at p. 11 (stating that “the number of big-ticket suits . . . against
[law] firms has risen dramatically since 1996").
3.  See Cutler, “The Themes of Sarbanes-Oxley as Reflected in the Commission’s
Enforcement Program,” http://sec.gov/news/speech/spch092004smc.htm at p. 5
(2004) (stating that the SEC has “named lawyers as respondents or defendants in
more than 30 of our enforcement actions in the past two years”).  For recent SEC
enforcement actions against legal counsel, see, e.g., SEC v. Yuen, SEC Litig. Rel.
No. 19047 (C.D. Cal. 2005); In re Google, Securities Act Release No. 8523 (SEC
2005); SEC v. Weiss, SEC Litig. Rel. No. 19002 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); proceedings
discussed in Steinberg, supra note 1, at §§ 4.01-4.03. 
4.  See , e.g., United States v. Gordon, 393 F.3d 1044 (9  Cir. 2004); NewYork v.th
Belnick, No. 00145/03 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004) (discussed in “N.Y. Jury Finds Ex-
Tyco Counsel Not Guilty on Larceny, Fraud Charges,” 36 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep.
(BNA) 1316 (2004)).
5.  See, e.g., Aguirre, “The Enron Decision: Closing the Fraud-Free Zone on
Errant Gatekeepers,” 28 Del. J. Corp. L. 447 (2003); Nicholson, “A Hobson’s
Choice for Securities Lawyers in the Post-Enron Environment: Striking a Balance
Between the Obligations of Client Loyalty and Market Gatekeepers,” 16 Geo. J.
Leg. Eth. 91 (2002); Oh, “Gatekeeping,” 29 J. Corp. L. 735 (2004); Sommer, “The
-29-
Emerging Responsibilities of the Securities Lawyer,” [1973-1974 Transfer Binder]
CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ¶ 79,631 (1974); Steinberg, “Attorney Liability for Client
Fraud,” 1991 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 1 (1991); Zacharias, “Lawyers as Gatekeepers,”
41 San Diego L. Rev. 1387 (2004).
In Lincoln Savings and Loan Association v. Wall, 743 F. Supp. 901 (D.D.C.
1990), Judge Stanley Sporkin inquired:
Where were these professionals, a number of whom are now
asserting their rights under the Fifth Amendment, when these clearly
improper transactions were being consummated?
Why didn’t any of them speak up or disassociate themselves from the
transactions?
Where also were the outside accountants and attorneys when these 
transactions were effectuated?
What is difficult to understand is that with all the professional talent
involved (both accounting and legal) why at least one professional would 
not have blown the whistle to stop the overreaching that took place in this
case.
Id. at 920.  See Editorial, “Judgment on Lincoln S & L,” Wash. Post, Aug. 8,
1990, at p. A26 (opining that Judge Sporkin’s assertion “is a charge to bar
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associations and accounting boards to consider this enormous failure of their
professional standards to protect both clients and the public”).  Certainly, it may
be argued that the recent financial fraud debacles accentuate this point.  The
revised ABA standards, discussed infra notes 6-14 and accompanying text, and the
SEC Standards of Conduct adopted in 2003, discussed infra notes 57-64 and
accompanying text, hopefully will ameliorate this problem.
6.  See American Bar Association (ABA), Model Rules of Professional Conduct,
rule 1.13(a) (2003); id. rule 1.13 comment 1 (stating that “[a]n organizational
client is a legal entity, but it cannot act except through its officers, directors,
employees, shareholders and other constituents”).  American Law Institute,
Restatement of the Law (Third), The Law Governing Lawyers § 96 comment b
(2000) (stating that “[a] lawyer who has been employed or retained to represent an
organization as a client owes professional duties of loyalty and competence to the
organization [and that] [b]y representing the organization, a lawyer does not
thereby also form a client-lawyer relationship with all or any individuals employed
by it, or who direct its operations or who have an ownership or other beneficial
interest in it, such as the shareholders”).    
7.  See Model Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 1.0(e) (defining “knows” to
mean “actual knowledge of the fact in question [which] may be inferred from
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circumstances”).
8.  Id. rule 1.13(b).  Comment 3 of Rule 1.13 provides:
When constituents of the organization make decisions for it, the 
decisions ordinarily must be accepted by the lawyer even if their utility or
prudence is doubtful.  Decisions concerning policy and operations,
including ones entailing serious risk, are not as such in the lawyer’s
province.  Paragraph (b) makes clear, however, that when the lawyer knows
that the organization is likely to be substantially injured by action of an
officer or other constituent that violates a legal obligation to the
organization or is in violation of law that might be imputed to the
organization, the lawyer must proceed as is reasonably necessary in the best
interest of the organization.  As defined in Rule 1.0(f), knowledge can be
inferred from circumstances, and a lawyer cannot ignore the obvious.
9.  See id. rule 1.16(a) (mandating withdrawal from representation if “the
representation will result in violation of the rules of professional conduct or other
law”); id. rule 1.16(b) (allowing withdrawal from representation if “the client
persists in a course of conduct involving the lawyer’s services that the lawyer
reasonably believes is criminal or fraudulent [or] the client has used the lawyer’s
services to perpetuate a crime or fraud”).
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10.  See Cal. Bus. And Prof. Code § 6068(e) (stating that it is an attorney’s duty
“to maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself or herself to
preserve the secrets, of his or her client”); California State Bar, Professional
Conduct Rules, rule 3-600(c) (“If, despite the member’s actions in accordance
with paragraph (B), the highest authority that can act on behalf of the organization
insists upon action or a refusal to act that is a violation of law and is likely to
result in substantial injury to the organization, the member’s response is limited to
the member’s right, and where appropriate, duty to resign in accordance with rule
3-700"); id. rule 3-600 comment 3 (allowing disclosure to nonclients when the
lawyer reasonably believes such disclosure “is necessary to prevent a criminal act
that the [lawyer] reasonably believes is likely to result in the death of, or
substantial bodily harm to an individual”).
11.  Today, over forty states permit or require an attorney to reveal a client’s crime
or fraud that threatens substantial financial loss.  See American Law Institute,
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 67 comment b (2000). 
Accord, ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, rules 1.6(b)(2), 1.13(e).  See
Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 1.6(b)(1) (allowing a lawyer to “reveal
such information to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary . . . [t]o
prevent the client from committing a crime”);  N.Y. Code of Professional
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Responsibility DR 4-101(c)(3) (allowing the attorney to reveal information
concerning “[t]he intention of a client to commit a crime and the information
necessary to prevent the crime”).  In addition, several states allow counsel to
reveal confidential information to nonclients “to the extent revelation reasonably
appears necessary to rectify the consequences of a client’s criminal or fraudulent
act in the commission of which the lawyer’s services had been used.”  Texas
Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 1.05(c)(8).  Accord, ABA Model
Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 1.6(b)(3); ALI, Restatement (Third) of the
Law Governing Lawyers § 67(2).  A few states require disclosure of client fraud in
this context.  See, e.g., New Jersey Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 1.6(b). 
Also, a number of states mandate that counsel make a “noisy” withdrawal.  See,
e.g., Tennessee Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 4.1(b), (c). See generally M.
Steinberg, Lawyering and Ethics for the Business Attorney 15-28 (2002);
Cramton, “Enron and the Corporate Lawyer: A Primer on Legal and Ethical
Issues,” 58 Bus. Law. 143 (2002); Simon, “Whom (or What) Does the
Organization’s Lawyer Represent?  An Anatomy of Intraclient Conflict,” 91 Calif.
L. Rev. 57 (2003).
12.  ABA, Model Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 1.2(d).  See id. rule 1.2
comment 10:
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When the client’s course of action has already begun and is
continuing, the lawyer’s responsibility is especially delicate.  The lawyer is 
required to avoid assisting the client, for example, by drafting or delivering
documents that the lawyer knows are fraudulent or by suggesting how the
wrongdoing might be concealed.  A lawyer may not continue assisting a
client in conduct that the lawyer originally supposed was legally proper but
then discovers is criminal or fraudulent.  The lawyer must, therefore,
withdraw from the representation of the client in the matter.  See Rule
1.16(a).  In some cases, withdrawal alone might be insufficient.  It may be
necessary for the lawyer to give notice of the fact of withdrawal and to
disaffirm any opinion, document, affirmation or the like.  See Rule 4.1.
13.  For further discussion, see Glazer, Fitzgibbon and Weise, Legal Opinions (2d
ed. 2004); Steinberg, supra note 1, at §§ 2.05, 11.03.
14.  See ABA, Model Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 4.1. 
15.  See, e.g., Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 4.1 (setting forth
reasonably should have known standard).
16.  Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 77j(b).  
17.  See, e.g., Fortson v. Winstead, McGuire, Sechrest & Minick, 961 F.2d 469,
472 (4  Cir. 1992), citing, Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228 (1980)th
(quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 551(2)(a) (1976)).  See also, Schatz v.
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Rosenberg, 943 F.2d 485, 490 (4  Cir. 1991) (holding that a lawyer or law firmth
cannot be held liable for misrepresentation under § 10(b) for failing to disclose
information about a client to a third party absent some fiduciary or other
confidential relationship with the third party); Abell v. Potomac Insurance Co.,
858 F.2d 1104, 1124-1126 (5  Cir. 1988), judgment vacated on other grounds,th
492 U.S. 914 (1989) (holding legal counsel had no affirmative duty to disclose
under § 10(b)); Barker v. Henderson, Franklin, Starnes & Holt, 797 F.2d 490, 496
(7  Cir. 1986) (“Neither lawyers nor accountants are required to tattle on theirth
clients in the absence of some duty to disclose.”); Lycan v. Walters, 904 F. Supp.
884, 901 (S.D. Ind. 1995) (stating that no evidence was offered to suggest that the
attorney owed the nonclients “any duty to disclose [and that] [w]ithout such a
duty, any omission by [counsel] would not support a claim under 10b-5 or 10(b)”).
18.  See, e.g., Fortson v. Winstead, McGuire, Sechrest & Minick, 961 F.2d at 472;
Schatz v. Rosenberg, 943 F.2d at 490-492; Barker v. Henderson, Franklin, Starnes
& Holt, 797 F.2d at 496.
19.  See 37 C.J.S. Fraud § 61(b)(3) (1943) (“Mere silence in the face of a third
person’s fraud will not render defendant liable unless there is a duty to speak.”).
20.  Fortson, 961 F.2d at 272 (citing Windon Third Oil & Gas Drilling Partnership
v. FDIC, 805 F.2d 342, 347 (10  Cir. 1986)).  See Chiarella v. United States, 445th
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U.S. 222, 228 (1980) (holding in § 10(b) insider trading context duty to disclose
arises from a fiduciary or similar relationship of trust and confidence); Barker, 797
F.2d at 496 (finding that because neither § 10(b) nor Rule 10b-5 imposes such a
duty to disclose, any such duty “must come from a fiduciary relation outside the
securities law”).  See generally W. Wang and M. Steinberg, Insider Trading (2d
ed. 2005).
Note that a relatively small number of state ethical codes mandate attorney
disclosure of client fraud.  See, e.g., N.J. Rules of Professional Conduct, rule
1.6(b)(1) (requiring a lawyer to reveal client confidences when the client’s actions
are “likely to result in . . . substantial injury to the financial interest or property of
another”).  Also, a number of states require counsel when faced with client fraud
or illegality to make a noisy withdrawal under specified conditions.  See, e.g,
Tennessee Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 4.1(b), (c).
21.  See sources cited supra notes 2-5.  See also, Meyerhofer v. Empire Fire &
Marine Insurance Co., 497 F.2d 1190, 1192-1193 (2d Cir. 1974).
22.  Barker v. Henderson, Franklin, Starnes & Holt, 797 F.2d 490, 496 (7  Cir.th
1986).
23.  Id. at 497.  See cases cited supra note 2.  Note, however, language contained
in a few decisions suggest that counsel may have an independent disclosure
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obligation.  See, e.g., Felts v. National Accounting System Associations, Inc.,
[1979 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ¶ 96,890, at p. 95,520 (N.D. Miss.
1978).  See also,  SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., [1971-1972 Transfer
Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ¶ 93,360, at pp. 91,913-91,917 (D.D.C. 1972)
(SEC complaint alleging subject company’s lawyers had duty to disclose client’s
illegality to the SEC).
24.  See, e.g., Bernstein v. Portland Savings and Loan Association, 850 S.W. 2d
694 (Tex. App. 1993):
The . . . cases that outline fraud through silence do not create
in lawyers a duty to disclose confidential information about their client to
third parties; this absence of duty is emphasized when the lawyer has no
fiduciary or confidential relationship with that third party.  The state bar
rules indicate that the duty runs to the client and to remain silent.  We look
to these rules as guides, not as binding law.  Attorneys are barred from
knowingly revealing confidential information about their clients by 
the Supreme  Court of Texas, Rules Governing the State Bar of Texas
(SBR). . . .  This rule is tempered by Rule 1.05(c)(7), which states that
attorneys may reveal confidential information in order to prevent the client
from committing a fraudulent act. . . .   Even if the attorneys have
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confidential information “clearly establishing that a client is likely to
commit a . . . fraudulent act,” they are only required to reveal confidential
information if that act is likely to result in death or substantial bodily harm
to a person. . . .   Because the Texas Supreme Court has chosen not to force
attorneys to disclose client confidences to avert non-violent fraud by clients,
we decline to do so as well.
Id. at 701 (emphasis in original).  See generally, Symposium, “The Role of a
Corporate Lawyer,” 33 Capital U.L. Rev. No. 1 (2004); Symposium, “Ethics in
Corporate Representation,” 74 Fordham L. Rev. No. 3 (2005); Symposium,
“Enron: Lessons and Implications,” 8 Stan. J. Law Bus. & Fin. No. 1 (2002);
Symposium, “Lessons from Enron, How Did Corporate and Securities Law Fail?,”
48 Vill. L. Rev. No. 4 (2003); Langevoort, “‘Where Were the Lawyers?  A
Behavioral Inquiry Into Lawyers’ Responsibility for Clients’ Fraud,” 46 Vand. L.
Rev. 75 (1993); Painter and Duggan, “Lawyer Disclosure of Corporate Fraud:
Establishing a Firm Foundation,” 50 SMU L. Rev. 225 (1996); Phillips, “Client
Fraud and the Securities Lawyer’s Duty of Confidentiality,” 49 Wash. & Lee L.
Rev. 923 (1992); Steckman, “Attorney Liability for Client Fraud,” 28 Sec. Reg.
L.J. 207 (2000); Veasey, “Counseling Directors in the New Corporate Culture, 59
Bus. Law. 1447 (2004).
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25.  See, e.g., “Attorney’s Conduct in Issuing an Opinion Letter Without
Conducting an Inquiry of Underlying Facts Failed to Comport with Applicable
Standards of Conduct,” Securities Exchange Act Release No. 17831, 22 SEC
Docket 1200 (1981) (Section 21(a) Report) (asserting that counsel’s inquiry was
“totally inadequate and facilitated the bond closing and bond sales to the public,”
the Commission, drawing on ABA Formal Opinion 335, stated: “Unless lawyers,
carefully and competently ascertain the relevant facts and make a reasonable
inquiry of their clients to obtain facts not within their personal knowledge, their
opinions may facilitate fraudulent transactions in securities.  This is so particularly
as the investing public looks to the lawyer’s opinion as a safeguard against
violations of the federal securities laws.”  22 SEC Docket at 1202).
Another example is the SEC’s response to the “Georgetown Petition” where
the Commission was requested to adopt three proposed rules, which would have
had the effect of amending the Commission’s disclosure forms to require
disclosure by corporations of: (1) certification by the board of directors that it has
instructed all attorneys employed or retained by the corporation to report to the
board certain corporate activities discovered by the attorney which, in the
attorney’s opinion, violate or probably violate the law; (2) written agreements
between the corporation and outside counsel which specify, among other things,
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the frequency and nature of counsel’s contacts with the board of directors; and (3)
the circumstances of resignations or dismissals of general counsel or securities
attorneys of the corporation.  Securities Exchange Act Release No. 16045, 17 SEC
Docket 1376 (1979).   The Commission put out the request for public comment,
without taking a position on the merits of the proposal.  The Commission received
over 300 public comments regarding this proposal.  Subsequently, the
Commission determined to deny the petition.  Securities Exchange Act Release
No. 16769, 19 SEC Docket 1300 (1980).
In its release denying the petition, the Commission noted that one of the
several reasons for denial urged by commentators was that many of the questions
concerning “the nature of the obligations of attorneys to make appropriate
disclosure of corporate illegalities they discover” were being addressed in the
private sector.  19 SEC Docket at 1301.  Thus, the Commission expressed the view
that “it would be inappropriate, at this time, to consider further the rules proposed
by the Institute” in light of the concerns expressed by the commentators,
“particularly with respect to . . . the initiative in this area being taken by the legal
profession. . . .”  Id. at 1302.
26.  See, e.g., In re Google, Securities Act Release No. 8523 (SEC 2004); In re
Isselmann, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 50428 (SEC 2004); In re Watt,
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Securities Exchange Act Release No. 46899 (SEC 2002).
27.  See, e.g., SEC v. Cavanagh, 155 F.3d 129 (2d Cir. 1998); SEC v. Haswell,
654 F.2d 698 (10  Cir. 1981); SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., 457 F.th
Supp. 682 (D.D.C. 1978).
28.  See, e.g., proceedings cited infra notes 32-33.
29.  See proceedings cited infra notes 32-56.
30.  In re Fields, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ¶ 79,407
(SEC 1973), aff’d without opinion, 495 F.2d 1075 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
31.  Id. at pp. 83,174-83,175 n.20.  The Commission also stated that the securities
lawyer “works in his office where he prepares prospectuses, proxy statements,
opinions of counsel, and other documents that we, our staff, the financial
community, and the investing public must take on faith.”
32.  In re Keating, Muething & Klekamp, Securities Exchange Act Release No.
15982, [1979 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed Sec. L. Rep. ¶ 82,124 (SEC 1979).  See
In re Plotkin, Yolles, Siegel and Turner, Securities Act Release No. 5841, 12 SEC
Docket 263 (SEC 1977); In re Ferguson, Securities Act Release No. 5523, 5 SEC
Docket 37 (SEC 1974).  See Steinberg, “Attorney Liability for Client Fraud,” 1991
Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 1, 20-21 (1991):
With respect to the adequacy of law firm internal procedures, In re
Keating stands for the proposition that lawyers in a firm should
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communicate with one another when preparing disclosure documents, such
as SEC filings.  In the context of federal securities law practice, an adequate
system helps to ensure that the material facts concerning a client that are
known to individual lawyers of the firm are communicated to those
attorneys in the firm who draft the disclosure documents.  By implementing
sufficient procedures, a law firm adequately discloses material facts relating
to a client that are within the firm’s possession. 
Id.  Significantly, the SEC pointed out in In re Keating that “[t]his case generally
does not involve the extent to which law firms have a duty to inquire of a client for
information.  We are here speaking only about that information already possessed
by the firm.” [1979 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ¶ 82,124, at p. 81,989
n.13.  With respect to the SEC Standards of Conduct, discussed infra notes 57-64
and accompanying text, one source has asserted:
[T]he existence of [the SEC Standards of Conduct] obligation may spur the
creation of internal systems within law firms for identifying potential client
wrongdoing and responding more self-consciously and with more levels of
review.  Systems of that type may reduce the vulnerability of law firms to
the poor decisions of partners whose individual stakes in a client have
compromised their objectivity.  In other words, the rules may lead to the
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establishment of institutional bulwarks against avoidance and
rationalization.
Sargent, “Lawyers in the Perfect Storm, 43 Washburn L.J. 1, 38 (2003).
33.  For recent proceedings against attorneys, see, e.g., In the Matter of Campbell,
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 50906 (2004); In the Matter of Smith,
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 50566 (2004); In the Matter of Oliver,
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 50565 (2004); In the Matter of Labertew,
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 49039 (2004); proceedings cited infra notes
36-56.  Rule 102(e) proceedings normally are public unless the Commission, at a
party’s request or on its own motion, orders that a particular Rule 102(e)
proceeding be private.  See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 25893, [1987-
1988 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ¶ 84,248 (1988).
34.  An original proceeding pursuant to Rule 102(e) is conducted as an
administrative proceeding before a federal administrative law judge with a right to
review by the Commission and judicial review by a United States Court of
Appeals.  Some orders imposing restrictions on practice, however, are entered as a
result of an SEC enforcement action, such as an injunction, or a felony conviction,
or by consent in settlement of outstanding charges.  “Practicing” before the
Commission, as defined in Rule 102(g), “shall include, but shall not be limited to
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(1) transacting any business with the Commission; and (2) the preparation of any
statement, opinion or other paper by any attorney, accountant, engineer or other
expert, filed with the Commission in any registration statement, notification,
application, report or other document with the consent of such attorney,
accountant, engineer or other expert.”  See also, SEC v. Ezrine, Civil Action No.
73-3121 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), where the district court defined “practicing” as:
. . . participating, in a representative capacity, in any administrative
proceeding, investigation, or conference concerning matters within the
Commission’s jurisdiction, (b) participating, in a representative capacity, in
connection with matters within the Commission’s jurisdiction when it
appears or reasonably should appear that a Commission proceeding or
investigation will be instituted therewith, (c) representing any broker or
dealer, investment company or investment advisor registered with the
Commission in connection with any matter arising under or relating to the
federal securities laws and (d) representing or advising any entity or person
in connection with the preparation or filing of documents as may be
required to be filed with the Commission under the federal securities laws.
See SEC Litigation Release No. 5495 at n.26 (1972).
35.  See SOX § 602, adding, § 4C(a) to the Securities Exchange Act.
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36.  See, e.g., In re Keating, Muething & Klekamp, [1979 Transfer Binder] CCH
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ¶ 82,124, at p. 81,981 (SEC 1979) (dissenting opinion).  See
also, Downing and Miller, “The Distortion and Misuse of Rule 2(e),” 54 Notre
Dame Law. 784 (1979); Fiflis, “Current Problems of Accountant’s
Responsibilities to Third Parties,” 28 Vand. L. Rev. 31, 63-64 (1975); Kelleher,
“Scourging the Moneylenders from the Temple: The SEC, Rule 2(e), and the
Lawyers,” 17 San Diego L. Rev. 501 (1980); Krane, “The Attorney Unshackled:
SEC Rule 2(e) Violates the Client’s Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel,” 57
Notre Dame Law. 50 (1981); Seamons, “Inside the Labyrinth of the Elusive
Standard Under the SEC’s Rule 2(e),” 23 Sec. Reg. L.J. 57 (1977); Note, “SEC
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Attorneys Under Rule 2(e),” 79 Mich. L. Rev.
1270 (1981).
In 1998, the SEC amended Rule 102(e).  Securities Act Release No. 7593,
[1998 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ¶ 86,052 (1998).  As amended,
Rule 102(e)(1)(ii) defines “improper professional conduct” for accountants to
mean:
(A) Intentional or knowing conduct, including reckless conduct, that
results in a violation of applicable professional standards; or
(B) Either of the following two types of negligent conduct:
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(1) A single instance of highly unreasonable conduct that results in
a violation of applicable professional standards in
circumstances in which an accountant knows, or should know,
that heightened scrutiny is warranted.
(2) Repeated instances of unreasonable conduct, each resulting in a
violation of applicable professional standards, that indicate a
lack of competence to practice before the Commission.
In the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Congress codified this interpretation. 
SOX § 602, adding, § 4C(b) to the Securities Exchange Act.
37.  See, e.g., Answering Brief of the SEC at p. 15 in Touche Ross & Co. v. SEC,
609 F.2d 570 (2d Cir. 1979).
38.  SOX § 602, adding, § 4C to the Securities Exchange Act.
39.  See, e.g., Marrie v. SEC, 374 F.3d 1196 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (reversing SEC
order against subject accountants on basis that applicable standard was not clear at
the time of the alleged misconduct); Checkowsky v. SEC, 139 F.3d 221 (D.C. Cir.
1998) (dismissing Rule 102(e) proceeding against two auditors because of
Commission’s failure to define applicable legal standard).
40.  See, e.g., Checkowsky v. SEC, 23 F.3d 452 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Touche Ross &
Co. v. SEC, 609 F.2d 570 (2d Cir. 1979); Koden v. U.S. Department of Justice,
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564 F.2d 228, 234 (7  Cir. 1977); SEC v. Csapo, 533 F.2d 7, 12 (D.C. Cir. 1976);th
Fields v. SEC, 495 F.2d 1075 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Kivitz v. SEC, 475 F.2d 956 (D.C.
Cir. 1973); Schwebel v. Orrick, 153 F. Supp. 701, 704 (D.D.C. 1957), aff’d on
other grounds, 251 F.2d 919 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 927 (1958).
See generally, Callcott, “D.C. Circuit Casts Doubt on The Breadth of SEC
Rule 2(e),” 8 Insights No. 10, at p. 10 (Oct. 1994); Dolin, “SEC Rule 2(e) After
Carter-Johnson and Toward a Reconciliation of Purpose and Scope,” 9 Sec. Reg.
L.J. 331 (1982); Goelzer and Wyderko, “Rule 2(e): Securities and Exchange
Commission Discipline of Professionals,” 85 Nw. U.L. Rev. 652 (1991);
Gruenbaum, “The SEC’s Use of Rule 2(e) to Discipline Accountants and Other
Professionals,” 56 Notre Dame Law. 820 (1981); Lorne and Callcott,
“Administrative Actions Against Lawyers Before the SEC,” 50 Bus. Law. 1293
(1995); Marsh, “Rule 2(e) Proceedings,” 35 Bus. Law. 987 (1980); “Report of the
Task Force on Rule 102(e) Proceedings: Rule 102(e) Sanctions Against
Accountants,” 52 Bus. Law. 965 (1997); Maxey, “SEC Enforcement Actions
Against Securities Lawyers: New Remedies vs. Old Policies,” 22 Del. J. Corp. 537
(1997); Russell, “Cries and Whispers: Environmental Hazards, Model Rule 1.6,
and the Attorney’s Conflicting Duties to Clients and Others,” 72 Wash. L. Rev.
409 (1997).
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41.  609 F.2d 570 (2d Cir. 1979).
42.  Id. at 581, quoting, United States v. Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854, 863 (2d Cir.
1964).
43.  609 F.2d at 582.  Accord, Davy v. SEC, 792 F.2d 1418 (9  Cir. 1986).  Seeth
also, KPMG LLP v. SEC, 289 F.3d 109 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (rejecting argument that
Rule 102(e) is the exclusive means for the SEC to address alleged accountant
misconduct).
44.  See 609 F.2d at 582 n.21.
45.  In re Keating, Muething Klekamp, [1979 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. ¶ 82,124, at pp. 81,988-81,989 (SEC 1979).
46.  Id. at p. 81,988.
47.  In re Carter and Johnson, [1981 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ¶
82,847 (SEC 1981).
48.  Answering Brief of the Office of the General Counsel at 99-106, In re Carter
and Johnson, File No. 3-5464 (1979).
49.  In re Carter and Johnson, [1981 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 
¶ 82,847 (SEC 1981). 
50.  In re Carter and Johnson, [1979 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. L. Rep. 
¶ 82,175 (1979).
51.  In re Carter and Johnson, [1981 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. L. Rep. 
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¶ 82,847, at pp. 84,146-84,150 (SEC 1981).
52.  Id. at pp. 84,167-84,169.
53.  Id. at pp. 84,169-84,170.
54.  Id. at pp. 84,170.
55.  Id. at pp. 84,169-84,172.
56.  Id. at pp. 84,172-84,173.  There was no issue in the case as to whether the
lawyer had a duty to make public disclosure of the confidences and secrets of the
corporate client.
57.  SOX § 307, 15 U.S.C. § 7245.  Note that the statute encompasses not only a
material violation of securities law but also a “breach of fiduciary duty or similar
violation by the company or any agent thereof . . . .”   With respect to up-the-
ladder reporting, one source has opined:
The nature of the legal market gives lawyers – both in-house and
outside counsel – strong incentives to overlook management wrongdoing. 
As to the former, even if the in-house general counsel is formally appointed
by the board of directors, his tenure normally depends mainly on his
relationship with the CEO.  As for outside legal counsel, they also must
please management in order to retain the firm’s business and to attract the
business of future clients.  This pressure is especially true given the large
number of capable firms and attorneys available for hire; law firms are
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something akin to a fungible good. . . .  Hence, outside counsel likely will
be reluctant to pursue management conduct aggressively by reporting it to
the board of directors.
Bainbridge and Johnson, “Managerialism, Legal Ethics, and Sarbanes-Oxley
Section 307,” 2004 Mich. St. L. Rev. 299, 306-307 (2004).
58.  See supra notes 6-14 and accompanying text.  Note, however, that the SEC
Standards do not have a knowledge requirement to trigger application.  See infra
notes 59, 61.
59.  Implementing Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 47276, [2002-2003 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. ¶ 86,823 (2003) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 205).  The SEC Standards define
evidence of a material violation as meaning “credible evidence, based upon which
it would be unreasonable, under the circumstances, for a prudent and competent
attorney not to conclude that it is reasonably likely that a material violation has
occurred, is ongoing, or about to occur.”  17 C.F.R. § 205.2(e).  Under the SEC
Standards, subordinate lawyers generally may satisfy this obligation by informing
their supervisory attorney of evidence of material violation(s).  See id.  § 205.5(c). 
For all of its emphasis on “plain English” (see, e.g., Plain English Disclosure,
Securities Act Release No. 7497 (1998) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 228, 229), the
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SEC should do better when adopting standards that regulated persons must follow. 
See Norris, “No Positives in This Legal Double Negative,” N.Y. Times, Jan. 24,
2003, at C1 (criticizing language and context of definition of “evidence of a
material violation”).
The SEC Standards define the term “appropriate response” as follows:
Appropriate response means a response to an attorney regarding
reported evidence of a material violation as a result of which the attorney
reasonably believes:
(1) That no material violation, as defined in paragraph (i) of this rule,
has occurred, is ongoing, or is about to occur;
(2) That the issuer has, as necessary, adopted appropriate remedial
measures, including appropriate steps or sanctions to stop any material
violations that are ongoing, to prevent any material violation that has yet to
occur, and to remedy or otherwise appropriately address any material
violation that has already occurred and to minimize the likelihood of its
recurrence; or
(3) That the issuer, with the consent of the issuer’s board of directors,
a committee thereof to whom a report could be made pursuant to Rule
3(b)(3), or a qualified legal compliance committee, has retained or directed
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an attorney to review the reported evidence of a material violation and
either:
(i) Has substantially implemented any remedial
recommendations made by such attorney after a reasonable
investigation and evaluation of the reported evidence; or 
(ii) Has been advised that such attorney may, consistent with
his or her professional obligations, assert a colorable defense of
behalf of the issuer (or the issuer’s officer, director, employee, or
agent, as the case may be) in any investigation or judicial or
administrative proceeding relating to the reported evidence of a
material violation.
17 C.F.R. § 205.2(b).
60.  As defined in Section 205.2(k) of the SEC Standards, a Qualified Legal
Compliance Committee (QLCC) is a committee of a publicly-held issuer (which
committee may also be the audit or other committee of the issuer) that:
(1) Consists of at least one member of the issuer’s audit committee (or, if
the issuer has no audit committee, one member from an equivalent
committee of independent directors) and two or more members of the
issuer’s board of directors who are not employed, directly or indirectly, by
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the issuer and who are not, in the case of a registered investment company,
“interested persons” as defined in section 2(a)(19) of the Investment
Company Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80a-2(a)(19));
(2) Has adopted written procedures for the confidential receipt, retention,
and consideration of any report of evidence of a material violation under 
§ 205.3;
(3) Has been duly established by the issuer’s board of directors, with the
authority and responsibility:
(i) To inform the issuer’s chief legal officer and chief executive
officer (or the equivalents thereof) of any report of evidence of a
material violation (except in the circumstances described in §
205.3(b)(4));
(ii) To determine whether an investigation is necessary regarding any
report of evidence of a material violation by the issuer, its officers,
directors, employees or agents and, if it determines an investigation is
necessary or appropriate, to:
(A) Notify the audit committee or the full board of trustees;
(B) Initiate an investigation, which may be conducted either by
the chief legal officer (or the equivalents thereof) or by outside
-54-
attorneys; and
(C) Retain such additional expert personnel as the committee
deems necessary; and
(iii) At the conclusion of any such investigation, to:
(A) Recommend, by majority vote, that the issuer implement an
appropriate response to evidence of a material violation; and 
(B) Inform the chief legal officer and the chief executive
officer (or the equivalents thereof) and the board of directors of
the results of any such investigation under this section and the
appropriate remedial measures to be adopted; and
(4) Has the authority and responsibility, acting by majority vote, to take all
other appropriate action, including the authority to notify the Commission in
the event that the issuer fails in any material respect to implement an
appropriate response that the qualified legal compliance committee has
recommended the issuer to take.
17 C.F.R. § 205.2(k).  At this time, it appears that the QLCC option may not be
widely adopted.  See McTague and Brady, “QLCC Option in New Conduct Rule
Could Be Disadvantage to Corporate G.C.,” 35 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 354
(2003).  Indeed, as of September 30, 2005, only 456 registrants had established a
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QLCC, amounting to less than four percent of all publicly-held entities.  See
Rosen, “Resistances to Reforming Corporate Governance: The Diffusion of
QLCCS,” 74 Fordham L. Rev. 1251, 1252 (2005).
61.  SEC Press Release No. 2003-13 (Jan. 23, 2003).  Note that the up-the-ladder
provision “is triggered even if the attorney learns of violations that have nothing to
do with what the attorney is working on and even if they are unrelated to the
attorney’s services.”  “DC Bar Panelists Discuss Attorney Liability Under
Sarbanes-Oxley Act,” SEC Today, Vol. 2005-82 (April 29, 2005).  For a critical
article analyzing the SEC Standards in depth, see Cramton, Cohen and Koniak,
“Legal and Ethical Duties of Lawyers After Sarbanes-Oxley,” 49 Vill. L. Rev. 725
(2004).  Note that unlike Rule 1.13(b) of the ABA’s Model Rules of Professional
Conduct, which requires knowledge on the attorney’s part, the SEC sets forth a
murky objective standard.  See 17 C.F.R. § 205.2(e); supra note 59.
62.  17 C.F.R. § 205.1 (stating that “[w]here the standards of a state or other
United States jurisdiction where an attorney is admitted or practices conflict with
this part, this part shall govern”).
63.  See Cal. Bus. and Prof. Code § 6068(e); California State Bar, Professional
Conduct Rules, rule 3-600(c).
64.  See Reisinger, “Two State Bars [California and Washington] Protest SEC
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Rule,” Nat. L.J., Sept. 15, 2003, at p. 1; “Washington Ethics Opinion Portends
Clash Between SEC, State Rules on Revealing Fraud,” 35 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep.
(BNA) 1334 (2003); Speech by SEC General Counsel Giovanni P. Prezioso
Before the American Bar Association, Section of Business Law (Seattle Wash.
April 3, 2004), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch040304gpp.htm.
See generally Symposium, “The Evolving Legal and Ethical Role of the
Corporate Attorney After the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,” 52 Am. U. L. Rev.
No. 3 (2003); Symposium, “The Ethics 2000 Commission: The Adversary System
and the Lawyer-Client Relationship,” 70 Tenn. L. Rev. No. 1 (2002); Symposium,
“Ethics in Corporate Governance,” 3 Wyo. L. Rev. No. 2 (2003); Cramton, Cohen,
and Koniak, supra note 61; Groskaufmanis, “Climbing ‘Up-the-Ladder’:
Corporate Counsel and the SEC’s Reporting Requirement for Lawyers,” 89
Cornell L. Rev. 511 (2004); Hazen, “Administrative Law Controls on Attorney
Practice – A Look at the Securities and Exchange Commission’s Lawyer Conduct
Rules,” 55 Admin. L. Rev. 323 (2003); Karmel, “The Securities and Exchange
Commission Goes Abroad to Regulate Corporate Governance,” 33 Stetson L. Rev.
849 (2004); Winer and Bruch, “The SEC Standards of Professional Conduct:
Practicing Law Under the New Regime,” 35 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 391
(2003). 
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65.  See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 47276, [2002-2003 Transfer Binder]
CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ¶ 86,823 (2003).
66.  See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 46868, [2002-2003 Transfer Binder]
CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ¶ 86,802 (2002) (setting forth proposed § 205.3(d)).  As
used in the proposed rule, “disaffirm” means:
Disaffirm to the Commission, in writing, any opinion, document,
affirmation, representation, characterization, or the like in a document filed
with or submitted to the Commission, or incorporated into such a document,
that the attorney has prepared or assisted in preparing and that the attorney
reasonably believes is or may be materially false or misleading.
Id. at p. 86,541.  Interestingly, as set forth in Section 11(b)(1) and (b)(2) of the
Securities Act, a subject defendant (including a lawyer who expertises the
registration statement or who serves as a director of the issuer) may avoid liability
by making a noisy withdrawal:
Before the effective date of the registration statement or part thereof
in question, he/she (1) resigns from or takes such steps as are permitted by
law to resign from, or ceases or refuses to act in, every office, capacity or
relationship ascribed to him/her in the registration statement, and (2) advises
the SEC and the issuer in writing of the action taken and disavowing
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responsibility for such part of the registration statement.
After such part of the registration statement has become effective, (1)
if he/she was unaware that it had become effective, and, (2) upon becoming
aware of such fact, acts forthwith, (3) advises the SEC in writing as set forth
above, and (4) gives reasonable public notice that such part of the
registration statement had become effective without her/his knowledge.
M. Steinberg, Securities Regulation  414 (4  ed. 2004), interpreting, 15 U.S.C. th
§ 77k(b)(1), (b)(2).
67.  See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 47282, [2002-2003 Transfer Binder]
CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ¶ 86,824 (2003).
68.  Id. at p. 87,117.  See SEC Press Release No. 2003-13 (Jan. 23, 2003):
The Commission voted to extend for 60 days the comment period on
the “noisy withdrawal” and related provisions originally included in [the]
proposed [standard].  Given the significance and complexity of the issues
involved, including the implications of a reporting out requirement on the
relationship between issuers and their counsel, the Commission decided to
continue to seek comment and give thoughtful consideration to these issues.
The Commission also voted to propose an alternative to “noisy
withdrawal” that would require attorney withdrawal, but would require an
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issuer, rather than an attorney, to publicly disclose the attorney’s withdrawal
or written notice that the attorney did not receive an appropriate response to
a report of a material violation.  Specifically, an issuer that has received
notice of an attorney’s withdrawal would be required to report the notice
and the circumstances related thereto on form 8-K, 20-F, or 40-F, as
applicable, within two days of receiving the attorney’s notice.  Accordingly,
the proposal includes proposed amendments to forms 8-K, 20-F, and 40-F to
require issuers to report an attorney’s written notice under the proposed
rule.  The proposing release also will seek comment on whether there are
circumstances in which an issuer should be permitted not to disclose an
attorney’s written notice.
The proposed rules also would permit an attorney, if an issuer has not
complied with the disclosure requirement, to inform the Commission that
the attorney has withdrawn from representing the issuer or provided the
issuer with notice that the attorney has not received an appropriate response
to a report of a material violation.
Id.
69.  See Atkins, “Attorneys Call for Delay, More Discussion of SEC Rule
Proposals on Noisy Withdrawal,” 34 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 2045 (2002);
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Pacelle and Schroeder, “Proposed SEC Rules Could Turn Lawyers Into Whistle-
Blowers,” Wall St. J., Jan. 9, 2003, at p. A1.
70.  See, e.g., “Thirty Prominent Securities Lawyers Tell SEC Reporting Proposal
Threatens Public Firms,” 34 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1947 (2002).
71.  Id. at 1947 (asserting that the proposed rule “would impair [the] ability to
render independent legal advice”).
72.  See Comment Letter to the SEC from Professors Susan P. Koniak, Roger C.
Cramton and George M. Cohen (December 2002).
73.  ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 92-366 (1992)
(setting forth the limited instances in which an attorney may “disaffirm documents
prepared in the course of the representation that are being, or will be, used in
furtherance of [a] fraud, even though such a ‘noisy’ withdrawal may have the
collateral effect of inferentially revealing client confidences”).  
74.  Id.  A number of state ethical rules mandate that counsel make a noisy
withdrawal under specified circumstances.  For example, the Tennessee Rules of
Professional Conduct provide in Rule 1.4(b), (c):
(b) If, in the course of representing a client in a non-adjudicative 
matter, a lawyer knows that the client intends to perpetrate a crime or fraud,
the lawyer shall promptly advise the client to refrain from doing so and shall
consult with the client about the consequences of the client’s conduct.  If
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after such consultation, the lawyer knows that the client still intends to
engage in the wrongful conduct, the lawyer shall:
(1) Withdraw from the representation of the client in the
matter; and
(2) Give notice of the withdrawal to any person who the lawyer
knows is aware of the lawyer’s representation of the client in the
matter and whose financial or property interests are likely to be
injured by the client’s criminal or fraudulent conduct.  The lawyer
shall also give notice to any such person of the lawyer’s disaffirmance
of any written statements, opinions, or other material prepared by the
lawyer on behalf of the client and which the lawyer reasonably
believes may be used by the client in furtherance of the crime or
fraud.
(c) If a lawyer who is representing or has represented a client in a
non-adjudicative matter comes to know, prior to the conclusion of the
matter, that the client has, during the course of the lawyer’s representation
of the client, perpetrated a crime or fraud, the lawyer shall promptly advise
the client to rectify the crime or fraud and consult with the client about the
consequences of the client’s failure to do so.  If the client refuses or is
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unable to rectify the crime or fraud, the lawyer shall:
(1) If currently representing the client in the matter, withdraw
from the representation and give notice of the withdrawal to any
person whom the lawyer knows is aware of the lawyer’s
representation of the client in the matter and whose financial or
property interests are likely to be injured by the client’s criminal or
fraudulent conduct; and
(2) Give notice to any such person of the lawyer’s
disaffirmance of any written statements, opinions, or other material
prepared by the lawyer on behalf of the client and that the lawyer
reasonably believes may be used by the client in furtherance of the
crime or fraud.
75.  See ABA, Model Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 1.2 comment 10 (stating
that “[i]n some circumstances, withdrawal alone might be insufficient” and that
“[i]t may be necessary for the lawyer to give notice of the fact of withdrawal and
to disaffirm any opinion, document, affirmation or the like”); id. rule 4.1 comment
3 (stating that [s]ometimes it may be necessary for the lawyer to give notice of the
fact of withdrawal and to disaffirm an opinion, document, affirmation or the like”). 
See also, NY Code of Prof. Resp. DR 4-101(c)(5) (setting forth that a “lawyer may
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reveal . . . [c]onfidences or secrets to the extent implicit in withdrawing a written
or oral opinion or representation previously given by the lawyer and believed by
the lawyer still to be relied upon by a third person where the lawyer has discovered
that the opinion or representation was based on materially inaccurate information
or is being used to further a crime or fraud”); Tenn. Rules of Professional
Conduct, rule 1.4(b), (c) (requiring noisy withdrawal, discussed supra note 74).
76.  Compare Ganino v. Citizens Utilities Co., 228 F.3d 154 (2  Cir. 2000), withnd
Parnes v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 122 F.3d 539 (8  Cir. 1997).  See also, SEC Staffth
Accounting Bulletin 99, 64 Fed. Reg. 45,150 (Aug. 19, 1999).  See generally
Hodges, “The Qualitative Considerations of Materiality: The Emerging
Relationship Between Materiality and Scienter,” 30 Sec. Reg. L.J. 4 (2002).
77.  See Schwartz, “Lawyer Rules Go Too Far,” Nat. L.J., Dec. 16, 2002, at p.
A13.
78.  See “ABA Panelists Assess How Sarbanes-Oxley SEC Rules Will Change
Practice and Ethics,” 35 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 312 (2003) (quoting SEC
Chief Litigation Counsel David Kornblau that “obtain[ing] an opinion from
outside counsel” would be advisable in certain circumstances).  Such a second
opinion should focus on whether the reporting lawyer’s belief regarding evidence
of a material violation is reasonably likely to be valid.  But see infra note 80.
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79.  See ABA, Model Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 1.13(b); N.Y. Code of
Professional Responsibility, DR 5-109(b)(2); Texas Disciplinary Rules of
Professional Conduct, rule 1.12(c)(2).
80.  See Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys,
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 47276, [2002-2003 Transfer Binder] CCH
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ¶ 86,823, at pp. 87,105-87,108 (2003) (codified at 17 C.F.R. §§
205.2(b), 205.3(b)(6)(ii).  At this time, the SEC employs the term “colorable
defense” in this context.  Such a vague and weak standard would seem to be
counterproductive.  As stated by one source:
The existence of a colorable defense allows a lawyer-advocate once
a client’s conduct is challenged in a forum as unlawful, to argue that the
conduct, even if very likely illegal, is legal.  It has no other relevance.  The
colorable defense standard certainly should not be used to permit lawyers to
advise clients, particularly corporate clients with fiduciary obligations to
their owner-shareholders, to proceed with conduct that is very likely illegal. 
But that is precisely what could happen.  The rule as adopted suggests that
one alternative to stopping an ongoing fraud or abandoning plans to commit
a new fraud is to get an opinion from a lawyer that should the issuer be
investigated for the illegal conduct (there is no requirement in the definition
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that the investigation be underway, pending or even likely to occur), a
colorable defense would be available.  The SEC should not be suggesting to
anyone that the fact that a lawyer can (in good faith and/or reasonably) state
that a “colorable defense” would be available, if the action is ever
challenged, licenses an issuer to engage in activity that may more likely than
not be illegal.
Cramton, Cohen and Koniak, supra note 61, at 771.
81.  As this author opined over twenty years ago:
[T]he second opinion is not recommended as a ‘sure-proof’ mechanism.  
Its greatest attribute, however, is its precautionary deliberative nature.  For
clients who desire to procure such an opinion, it may well work to their
ultimate benefit.  For lawyers, the second opinion may lower the risks of
successful malpractice claims and may even lower the costs of malpractice
insurance premiums.
Sporkin and Steinberg, “Second Opinion for Lawyers – The ‘Consultative
Attorney,’ N.Y.L.J., Jan. 3, 1983, at pp. 1, 3.  See Editorial, “A Second Opinion,”
Nat. L.J., Jan. 10, 1983, at p. 12 (“We agree with Mr. Sporkin and Mr. Steinberg
that the concept is a good one, and that attorneys should be open to its use in the
future.”).
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82.  See Hooker, “Lawyers’ Responses to Audit Inquiries and the Attorney-Client
Privilege,” 35 Bus. Law. 1021 (1980).  The discussion contained in this Section
derives derives from Steinberg, “Attorney Liability for Client Fraud,” 1991
Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 1, 22-25 (1991).  With respect to overseeing the quality
control, ethical and auditing standards of accounting firms that audit publicly-held
companies, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) established the Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB).  See SOX § 101.  The duties of the
PCAOB, as set forth in the statute, are to:
(1) register public accounting firms that prepare audit reports for
issuers, in accordance with [SOX] section 102;
(2) establish or adopt, or both, by rule, auditing, quality control,
ethics, independence, and other standards relating to the preparation of audit
reports for issuers, in accordance with [SOX] section 103;
(3) conduct inspections of registered public accounting firms, in
accordance with [SOX] section 104 and the rules of the Board;
(4) conduct investigations and disciplinary proceedings concerning,
and impose appropriate sanctions where justified upon, registered public
accounting firms and associated persons of such firms, in accordance with
[SOX] section 105;
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(5) perform such other duties or functions as the Board (or the
Commission, by rule or order) determines are necessary or appropriate to
promote high professional standards among, and improve the quality of
audit services offered by, registered public accounting firms and associated
persons thereof, or otherwise to carry out this Act, in order to protect
investors, or to further the public interest;
(6) enforce compliance with this Act, the rules of the Board,
professional standards, and the securities laws relating to the preparation 
and issuance of audit reports and the obligations and liabilities of
accountants with respect thereto, by registered public accounting firms and
associated persons thereof; and
(7) set the budget and manage the operations of the Board and the
staff of the Board.
Id. § 101(c).
83.  For a review of “contingent liabilities” in the audit request setting, see
American Bar Association, “Statement of Policy Regarding Lawyers’ Responses
to Auditors’ Requests for Information,” 31 Bus. Law. 1709, 1712 (1976) (ABA
Policy Standard).
84.  See C. Wolfram. Modern Legal Ethics 677 (1986).
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85.  For an analysis of the attorney-client and work product privileges in the audit
inquiry setting, see Hooker, supra note 82, at 1021-1034.  The ABA
Subcommittee on Audit Inquiry Responses set forth model language for client
request letters and attorney response letters which attempts to preserve the
privileges from waiver.  See Subcommittee on Audit Inquiry Responses, “Inquiry
of a Client’s Lawyer Concerning Litigation, Claims, and Assessments: Auditing
Interpretation AU Section 337,” 45 Bus. Law. 2245 (1990).  See also, Fuld,
“Lawyers’ Responses to Auditors – Some Practical Aspects,” 44 Bus. Law. 159
(1988).
86.  See ABA Policy Statement, supra note 83, at 10 (providing a more detailed
discussion of the competing policy considerations).
87.  In addition, a failure to disclose material facts may be viewed by the auditor
“as a limitation on the scope of the audit, necessitating a disclaimer of opinion or,
depending on the circumstances, other qualification, which could render the
financial statements effectively unaudited.”  Lorne, “The Corporate and Securities
Advisor, the Public Interest, and Professional Ethics,” 76 Mich. L. Rev. 425, 448
(1978).  See Securities Act Release No. 4458 (1962) (“A ‘subject to’ or ‘exempt
for’ opinion paragraph in which those phrases refer to the scope of the audit . . . is
not acceptable in certificates filed with the Commission in connection with the
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public offering of securities.”).
88.  See Section 303(a) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act:  
It shall be unlawful, in contravention of such rules or regulations as
the Commission shall prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors, for any officer or director of an
issuer, or any other person acting under the direction thereof, to take any
action to fraudulently influence, coerce, manipulate, or mislead any
independent public or certified accountant engaged in the performance of an
audit of the financial statements of that issuer for the purpose of rendering
such financial statements materially misleading.
Implementing this directive, Rule 13b2-2(b)(1) provides:
No officer or director of an issuer, or any other person acting under the
direction thereof, shall directly or indirectly take any action to coerce,
manipulate, mislead, or fraudulently influence any independent public or
certified public accountant engaged in the performance of an audit or review
of the financial statements of that issuer that are required to be filed with the
Commission pursuant to this subpart or otherwise if that person knew or
should have known that such action, if successful, could result in rendering
the issuer’s financial statements materially misleading.
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89.  Securities Exchange Act Release No. 47890, [2003 Transfer Binder] CCH
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ¶ 86,921, at p. 87,661 (2003).  See Winer and Seabolt,
“Responding to Audit Inquiries in a Time of Heightened Peril,” 36 Sec. Reg. & L.
Rep. (BNA) 1902 (2004).  See also, Hinsey, “Communications Among Attorneys,
Management and Auditors,” 36 Bus. Law. 727 (1981).
90.  ABA Policy Statement, supra note 83, at 1712.
91.  Id. at 1712.  See Tew v. Arky, Freed, Stearns, Watson, Greer, Weaver &
Harris, 655 F. Supp. 1573 (S.D. Fla. 1987) (holding that law firm had no
disclosure duty to its client’s auditor where client did not identify its financial
difficulties in the auditor’s inquiry letter and did not request the law firm to
comment in regard thereto).
92.  ABA Policy Statement, supra note 83, at 1713.  According to the ABA Policy
Statement, “an unfavorable outcome for the client is probable if the prospects of
the claimant not succeeding are judged to be extremely doubtful and the prospects
for success by the client in its defense are judged to be slight.”  Id.  On the other
hand, “an unfavorable outcome is remote if the prospects for the client not
succeeding in its defense are judged to be extremely doubtful and the prospects of
success by the claimant are judged to be slight.”  Id.
93.  Id. at 1714.
94.  See Wolfram, supra note 84, at 678; Frank, “A Higher Duty: A New Look at
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the Ethics of the Corporate Lawyer,” 26 Clev. St. L. Rev. 337, 356 (1977).
95.  See supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text.
96.  See sources cited supra note 3.
97.  See Watson, “Relationships with Auditors: Heightened Tensions and Their
Impact on the Audit Response Process,” Securities Regulation and Business Law
Problems, University of Texas Law School (2005).  See also, Winer and Seabolt,
supra note 89, at 1905 (stating that “[a]ttorneys should refrain from representing
that they cannot form an opinion on the likely outcome of litigation”).
98.  13 Bankr. R. 54, 4 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 913, 7 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 1031, Bankr.
L. Rep. ¶ 68,073, 8 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 938 (Bkrtcy, S.D.N.Y., June 10, 1981) (No.
81 B 10533) et seq.  See Steinberg, supra note 82, at 21-22.
99.  See Sonde and Bierman, “O.P.M. Forces Counsel to Ponder Limits of
Disclosure,” Legal Times, Feb. 7, 1983, at p. 14.  For discussion on the O.P.M.
matter, see Comment, “The Client-Fraud Dilemma: A Need for Consensus,” 46
Md. L. Rev. 436 (1987).
100.  Unfortunately, sending “red flags” would be difficult if the successor
counsel is unaware of the predecessor counsel’s representation and resignation.
101.  See Brown, “Counsel With a Fraudulent Client,” 17 Rev. Sec. Reg. 909, 913
(1984).
102.  With respect to prospective successor counsel making inquiry of predecessor
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counsel, see the National Student Marketing Corp. settlement.  In that case, one of
the law firms that settled with the SEC agreed to the implementation of the
following procedures:
Prior to the undertaking by the Firm of corporate representation as principal
outside counsel of a prospective client having securities registered under the
Federal Securities Laws . . . if the Firm has ascertained that the
representation of such prospective client by its prior principal outside
counsel was terminated by such counsel, due inquiry will be made of such
prospective client as to the reasons for the change and the prospective client
will be requested to release such prior counsel from any obligation of
confidentiality for purposes of discussion with the Firm of the proposed
representation.  Appropriate documentation reflecting the results of any
such inquiry will be maintained by the Firm and will be available on a
continuing basis to lawyers actively participating in the Firm’s
representation of the client.
SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. ¶ 96,027, at p. 91,599 (D.D.C. 1977).
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with applicable disclosure standards, although there may be isolated
disclosure failures that are so serious that their correction becomes a matter
of primary professional concern.  It is also clear, however, that a lawyer is
not privileged to unthinkingly permit himself to be co-opted into an ongoing
fraud and cast as a dupe or a shield for a wrong-doing client.
Initially, counseling accurate disclosure is sufficient, even if his
advice is not accepted.  However, there comes a point at which a reasonable
lawyer must conclude that his advice is not being followed, or even sought
in good faith, and that his client is involved in a continuing course of
violating the securities laws.  At this critical juncture, the lawyer must take
further, more affirmative steps in order to avoid the inference that he has
been co-opted, willingly or unwillingly, into the scheme of nondisclosure.
The lawyer is in the best position to choose his next step. 
Resignation is one option, although we recognize that other considerations,
including the protection of the client against foreseeable prejudice, must be
taken into account in the case of withdrawal.  A direct approach to the board
of directors or one or more individual directors or officers may be
appropriate; or he may choose to try and enlist the aid of other members of
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that leads to the conclusion that the lawyer is engaged in efforts to correct
the underlying problem, rather than having capitulated to the desires of a
strong-willed, but misguided [constituent of a] client.
Some have argued that resignation is the only permissible course
when a client chooses not to comply with disclosure advice.  We do not
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client relationship nor, in most cases, the effective administration of the
securities laws.  The lawyer’s continued interaction with his client will
ordinarily hold the greatest promise of corrective action.  So long as a
lawyer is acting in good faith and exerting reasonable efforts to prevent
violations of the law by his client, his professional obligations have been
met.  In general, the best result is that which promotes the continued, strong-
minded and independent participation by the lawyer.
We recognize, however, that the ‘best result’ is not always
obtainable, and that there may occur situations where the lawyer must
conclude that the misconduct is so extreme or irretrievable, or the
involvement of his client’s management and board of directors in the
misconduct is so thorough-going and pervasive that any action short of
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